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Abstract
This paper will discuss the fundamental clash between  exibility and interoper
ability in CORBA security and in distributed object systems security in general
Also the impact of  exibilty and interoperability issues on the security of such sys
tems will be covered By presenting various relevant technical issues in CORBA
security this paper tries to identify where a reasonable tradeo between  exibil
ity and interoperability is achieved and where CORBA security has unnecessary
 exibility or interoperability limitations
  Introduction
The Common Object Request Broker Architecture  CORBA  enables soft
ware objects to transparently call other objects across networks This is
achieved by mediating all remote method invocations through an Object Re
quest Broker  ORB which hides the complexities of large dynamic and het
erogeneous distributed systems It is often referred to as a software bus	
analogous to a hardware bus which hides the communications between hard
ware devices CORBA object interfaces are speci
ed in a standardised Inter
face De
nition Language  IDL and objects can be located with Interoperable
Object References  IORs CORBA also speci
es a number of object services
such as naming events persistence time and security This paper is fo
cussed on the CORBA security services speci
cation  CORBAsec  which
promises transparency scalability reusability of the existing security infras
tructure exibility and interoperability The speci
cation tries to achieve
these goals by oering the following security functionality
 
Authentication clients and servers can verify the identity of the other party
c
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 
Message Protection data in transit can be protected from integrity and
con
dentiality attacks
 
Authorisation access to objects and operations can be controlled
 
Audit Audit logs can record which operations have been invoked by which
clients
 
NonRepudiation  optional irrefutable evidence of method invocations can
be generated and veri
ed
Instead of implementing all the security functionality itself CORBAsec
acts much more like an API which calls underlying security mechanisms such
as Kerberos v  SESAME  SPKM and SSL Therefore the functionality
oered by CORBAsec is always limited by the functionality oered by the
underlying security mechanisms
 Goals of CORBA Security
The fundamental goals of CORBAsec are based on the four principal goals of
secure systems con
dentiality integrity accountability and availability In
addition the CORBAsec speci
cation describes further requirements which
help achieve the fundamental goals
 
Simplicity the security system should be easy to understand to use and
to manage
 
Consistency the security system should 
t seamlessly into existing security
environments
 
Scalabilitythe security system should 
t both for small and for large sys
tems ie support for policy domains groups and roles
 
Transparency the security system should interfere as little as possible with
user activities
 
Easy administration the security system should be easy to understand and
administer
 
Easy implementation of applications the security should not be the con
cern of the application programmer a standard security policy should be
automatically enforced
 
Certi
cation it should be possible to evaluate and certify the security of
the security system and of the underlying security mechanisms according to
standard evaluation criteria  ITSEC Common Criteria
 
Assurance correct security enforcement of the security policy should always
be guaranteed
 
Mechanism independence CORBAsec should be independent from the un
derlying security technology
 
Flexibility CORBAsec should support a variety of dierent security policies
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and mechanisms
 
Interoperability CORBAsec should allow dierent implementations to in
teroperate
Some of these requirements conict in particular the clash between ex
ibility and assurance and the clash between exibility and interoperability
Also decisions to give up exibility for interoperability or assurance  and vice
versa can often aect the overall security eectiveness of the resulting system
This paper will focus on the clash between exibility and interoperability in
CORBAsec it will also try to capture the impact of these on security eec
tiveness The following section will de
ne the dierent aspects of exibility
and interoperability in CORBAsec
 Denition of Flexibility and Interoperability
In general maximum exibility is achieved by specifying as little as necessary
to allow vendors and users to customise the Security Services to their particular
needs Interoperability on the other hand is achieved by standardising as
much as possible to ensure that all products from dierent vendors provide the
same functionality to the outside regardless of their internal implementation
In addition there are several ways in which the concepts of exibility and
interoperability impact CORBA security depending on the relevant layer
CORBA tries to achieve the tradeo between exibility and interoperability
by specifying common object interfaces and methods while at the same time
giving vendors the freedom to implement the objects and methods as they
wish
From a middleware perspective exibility issues are to be considered up
wards to the application layer within the CORBAsec layer and downwards
to the security mechanisms Towards the layers above the middleware COR
BAsec needs to support a variety of dierent application environments Within
the middleware layer a variety of dierent security policies should be sup
ported by CORBAsec Also ORBs should be able to use a variety of COR
BAsec implementations from dierent vendors Towards the lower layers any
underlying security technology should be supported by CORBAsec
To preserve CORBAs goal of making CORBAcompliant systems from
dierent vendors work together CORBAsec interoperability needs to be en
sured between ORBs and Security Services from dierent vendors  security
replaceability	 between Security Services from dierent vendors between se
curity policy domains and between dierent security mechanisms To achieve
interoperability between ORBs and Security services from dierent vendors
socalled interceptor interfaces are standardised in the CORBACORBAsec
speci
cation through which the ORB automatically mediates all communica
tions The impact of the interceptor speci
cation on the security of the overall
system is considerable as the ORB needs to be guaranteed	 to mediate all

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requests through these interceptors To allow for interoperability between
Security Services from dierent vendors the Common Secure Interoperabil
ity	  CSI speci
cation de
nes standardised modi
cations to the communica
tions protocols  Secure Common InterORB Protocol	 SECIOP and object
references  Securityenhanced IOR	 to include representations for security
information which can be interpreted by all involved security services Inter
operability between domains with potentially incompatible security policies
can only be achieved if either both parties agree to accept the security at
tributes used by the other party or if socalled policy bridges	 are developed
which convert security attributes between the domains However this is often
impossible to achieve in particular if the domains use semantically dier
ent attributes Interoperability between security mechanisms can sometimes
be achieved by developing converters  socalled security gateways	 which
translate the communications between security mechanisms However this is
impossible in most cases as underlying mechanisms often use very dierent
protocols
The fundamental clash between exibility and interoperability is due to
the fact that exibility is achieved by allowing customisation and extension of
the Security Service whereas interoperability requires common standards for
interfaces data representations and protocols Obviously CORBAsec cannot
solve this problem but it can suggest a reasonable tradeo between exibil
ity and interoperability The remainder of this paper tries to identify where
this reasonably tradeo is achieved and where CORBAsec has unneccessary
exibility or interoperability limitations
 Examples of the FlexibilityInteroperability Trade
O
This section will go through a number of separate aspects of the CORBAsec
speci
cation and examine how much of a reasonable tradeo between exi
bility and interoperability is achieved If possible suggestions are given how
the tradeo could be optimised to increase either exibility interoperability
or the security eectiveness The order in which these aspects are discussed
is entirely arbitrary and should not be interpreted as ordered in decreasing
relevance or priority
  Attribute Types
Authentication in CORBAsec generates socalled Credential	 objects which
store security relevant privilege information about principals  which are de

ned as users or processes in CORBAsec and which are transferred to the
peer security service as part of the security context establishment Applica
tions and security services can query or modify this security information by
invoking methods on these Credentials objects Credentials objects also con

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tain internal security information about underlying security mechanisms which
can only be accessed by CORBAsec Credentials are locality constrained	
ie can only be accessed from within the execution context of the application
which owns	 the credentials
The de
nition of security attributes in CORBAsec clearly show the conict
of interoperability and exibility To enable interoperability the speci
cation
explicitly de
nes eleven standard attribute types such as AuditId	 or Ac
cessId	 which are grouped in two privilege attribute families The attribute
values on the contrary are speci
ed as unde
ned byte sequences  data type
opaque	 which is due to the fact that the attribute values generally depend
on the particular security mechanism that is using these attributes The spec
i
cation mentions here that someone who understands the attribute type can
decipher	   p  For exibility CORBAsec vendors are explicitly
allowed to de
ne their own extended attribute families to adapt CORBAsec
to their own particular needs but this extended de
nition has to be known
to all involved parties at compiletime in oder to preserve interoperability
This security attribute de
nition gives neither good exibility nor good
interoperability It is impossible to de
ne attributes exibly at runtime be
cause they have to be de
ned as constants in the IDL source code nor is the
source code of applications portable across security mechanisms because the
attribute values contain mechanismspeci
c information Besides that the
standard attribute types 
t for systems which use SESAME and Kerberos
as underlying security mechanisms but there are a problems for a number
of other mechanisms for example security attributes from X certi
cates
 which are often used with SSL cannot be mapped properly onto these stan
dard attribute types
One possible solution would be to de
ne a mandatory attribute type fam
ily for each security mechanism which maps the mechanism speci
c security
information onto CORBAsec attribute types This would also make it possible
to identify across security mechanisms which attribute types are comparable
and attribute types would be wellde
ned  as opposed to opaque	 and could
be derived from the family	 and the type	
However this approach is insucient if more exible attribute types are
required for example for the representation of complex access rights With the
current de
nition it is not even possible to specify the BellLaPadula security
model as privileges would need to contain both compartments and clearance
This type of compound privilege cannot be expressed with the standard se
curity attribute types instead implementers would need to code both parts
of the attribute into the opaque attribute value The standard access control
mechanism in CORBAsec would probably not be able to reach an access con
trol decision based on such a compound attribute and interoperability would
be impossible
One of the reasons for the lack of security attributes is that CORBAsec
only supports the push model	 where security attributes are always trans

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ferred from the client to the target To support a variety of security policies
CORBAsec would also need to support the pull model	 where additional
attributes outside the current security context are considered eg from di
rectory services or time servers
Consider the following policy example a principal should only be able to
invoke an object if she is not on holiday and if the invocation is made within of

ce hours Both the principals holiday information and work schedule is kept
in a directory server With the current version of CORBAsec it would be im
possible to formulate attriutes such as onHoliday	 or withinWorkingHours	
without signi
cant involvement of the application layer
To solve this problem a central  but potentially replicated or federated
attribute and policy directory could contain attributes  eg represented as
LDAP attributes which could be dynamically de
ned Also relations between
attribute types could be dynamically added to allow comparison of attributes
from diering security mechanisms Relevant environmental values could also
be stored in the directory Industrial research is currently untertaken  which
will be described in future publications
  Negotiation of Mechanisms and Policies
CORBAsec does currently not provide any negotiation facilities for security
policies or mechanisms between clients and targets The only way both parties
can agree on the used security mechanisms is through the mechanism speci

cation in the IOR This way the target can specify which mechanisms it is
willing to support and the client can pick one of the oered mechanisms The
chosen mechanism cannot be changed later without application intervention
This is particularly unfortunate for some application domains such as internet
based applications or telecommunications services as clients would want to
access an object to see what object it is and what services it provides and then
select the appropriate mechanism strength Similarly the server may want to
provide dierent mechanisms dependent on the speci
c caller which would
require the distribution of a number of dierent IORs for dierent clients
This interoperability restriction does not yield any exibility improvements
nor does it aect the eectiveness of the security system and should therefore
be included in CORBAsecs security context establishment
  Security Audit
The audit service allows administrators to transparently record security rele
vant events to make principals accountable for their actions in the CORBA sys
tem Socalled audit selectors	 determine which events should be recorded
CORBAsec speci
es standard selectors such as object reference successfailure
time and day of the week but it is possible to de
ne new event families to
extend or customise the audit model Events which should be logged are writ
ten into audit logs via audit channel	 objects which are the visible interfaces

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to the underlying audit trails
In order to promote maximumexibility CORBAsec does not specify stan
dard formats for audit records or audit trails  both stored and in transit This
is mainly due to the fact that CORBAsec does not mandate any particular
type of underlying audit technology and consequently does not provide any in
terfaces to query modify or transfer audit trails However this design decision
results in severe interoperability problems between audit systems in Security
Services from dierent vendors or with diering underlying audit technology
The format of audit records and audit trails is determined by the underlying
audit technology and can only be interpreted by audit services which use or
understand the same format Another problem is that CORBAsec does not
provide any ORB level mechanisms to transfer audit records or audit trails
transparently over the network This would need to be done by the appli
cations on both sides As a result of these issues a central audit trail store
 which is essential for eective audit trail 
ltering and analysis  would be
dicult and cumbersome to develop
One possible solution to this problem could be the de
nition of a standard
format for audit records which explicitly states the event type and selector
type possibly as a tuple consisting of name string and data This would allow

ltering and analysis services to parse the records and look for the names
of particular attributes If the record contains attributes which they do not
understand eg from extended selector families then these could be simply
ignored Also name mappings between diering audit services could be easily
speci
ed and kept up to date
Applications which require extended ORB level audit policies are generally
not portable across dierent security services or audit mechanisms because the
audit decision object lacks the functionality to get the information required for
the extended selectors Therefore extended ORB level audit policies should
be avoided if portability is required at the same time
In general there seems to be a reasonable tradeo between interoperabil
ity and exibility regarding the standard and extended audit selectors How
ever standard formats or query interfaces for audit records and audit trails
would improve interoperability and portability without compromising exi
bility The impact of this improvement on the overall security eectiveness
would not be signi
cant
   NonRepudiation
The CORBAsec nonrepudiation service provides application level function
ality to generate and verify irrefutible cryptographic evidence about princi
pals actions such as method invocations In accordance with the ISO Non
Repudiation Framework  the speci
cation also identi
es the need for deliv
ery authority evidence store and adjudicator but leaves those unspeci
ed in
the current version

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As with the audit service CORBAsec does not de
ne standard token for
mats for nonrepudiation mainly because the speci
cation does not mandate
any particular type of underlying nonrepudiation mechanism Consequently
there are no standard ways of transferring nonrepudiation tokens via CSI
without the involvement of the application This makes CORBAsec very ex
ible with respect to underlying nonrepudiation technology but at the same
time mandates the use of the same  or compatible technology for all par
ties otherwise interoperability is impossible This makes it very dicult and
cumbersome to develop a centralised delivery authority and an evidence store
which pulls together the nonrepudiation information from all parties in par
ticular if the underlying technologies are not compatible The lack of standard
formats for nonrepudiation tokens in transit further complicates this issue as
all involved applications would need to provide their own mechanism to trans
fer generated evidence to and from the evidence store
A standard representation of nonrepudiation tokens and the option of cus
tomising the token format if unusual technology is used would make interop
erability between Security Services possible to a certain extent In particular
the inclusion of a transparent token transfer mechanism into the communica
tions protocol would be useful for the development of a centralised evidence
store and retrieval facility Such a facility is essential for a variety of dierent
application domains eg telecommunications networks or electronic banking
systems because the generated evidence cannot be permanently stored in the
end nodes or centrally accessed for later analysis or adjudiation The security
of CORBAsec would not be aected by these modi
cations as the evidence is
cryptographically protected from the moment of its creation
Considering that nonrepudiation is one of the most important security
functions in many application domains it would be of considerable bene
t
to extend the current nonrepudiation model by the modi
cations mentioned
above
  Security Management
CORBAsecs security management is mainly concerned with secure creation
of objects location of domain managers associated with objects location of
relevant policies de
nition of policy details  ie of the security attributes
mentioned above for policy objects and speci
cation of the access control
policy Explicitly not speci
ed are the administration of security environment
domains security technology domains and of non securityrelevant aspects
of policies as these are implementation speci
c Also the administration
of security attributes of principals and the management of policy domains is
unspeci
ed The speci
cation identi
es that security policies can inuence the
security enforcement on several layers  on the application level the ORB level
security services other security services and underlying security mechanisms
but limits the extent to which CORBAsec covers these Again this is mainly

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due to the fact that some layers contain components which are outside the
scope of the speci
cation in particular the application level and the underlying
security mechanisms
This shows that many aspects of security management in CORBAsec are
implementation speci
c ie depend on components which are outside the
scope of of the speci
cation and will therefore generally not interoperate
across Security Services from dierent vendors However in many application
scenarios security aspects of CORBA systems with security mechanisms from
dierent vendors are to be centrally administered in order to be able to enforce
an organisationwide coherent security policy which would require a certain
level of standardisation
The real problem with security management in CORBAsec is that it is
unnecessarily underspeci
ed in its current version which forces CORBAsec
vendors to extend the speci
cation in nonstandard ways to be able to pro
vide at least a minimum level of functionality Therefore vendors get more
exibility than they would want at the cost of having to cope with unrea
sonable interoperability restrictions with Security Services from dierent ven
dors Due to the lack of standards the eectiveness and the resulting impact
on security has to be determined on a casetocase basis Also many re
quired centralised management applications cannot be developed because of
the lack of standards To delegate	 this problem the speci
cation refers to
a CORBA Management Common Facility	 which is supposed to contain the
missing functionality However this facility is currently not even at the draft
stage
  Secure Interoperability Model
The CORBA Security Services specify a model for secure interoperability be
tween ORBs and CORBAsec implementations from dierent vendors which
extends the CORBA interoperability model by adding  mechanismspeci
c
security information into the IORs and by specifying security protocols on
top of CORBAs IIOP protocol namely SECIOP SSLIOP  for SSL and
DCEIOP  for DCE Secure interoperability is achieved if both client and tar
get use the same security mechanisms and the same interoperability protocol
and if the security policies are consistent	 ie both parties have matching
security requirements for the connection The current version of CORBAsec
does not provide negotiation mechanisms other than allowing the speci
cation
of supported mechanisms in the IOR which the client can select from when es
tablishing the connection This is an unneccessary exibility restriction which
could be solved without compromising interoperability by establishing a secu
rity negotiation protocol This would also allow clients or targets to enforce
dierent security policies depending on peer identity or type of action How
ever the impact of such a negotiation facility on the security eectiveness
could be signi
cant as attackers could tamper with the negotiation protocol

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if it is insuciently protected
Interoperability between Security Services which use dierent securitymech
anisms is often impossible The speci
cation mentions  but does not specify
socalled gateways	 wich could translate messages between dierent security
mechanisms but this concept has a number of drawbacks Firstly often mech
anisms are so fundamentally incompatible that such a mapping is infeasible
Secondly even if a mapping is possible such a gateway poses a signi
cant
security risk because it has to be able to access all security information of
both parties eg cryptographic keys in order to translate the trac The
concept of such a trusted host fundamentally conicts with CORBAsecs end
toend security architecture The only feasible tradeo is to de
ne a set of
mandatory security mechanisms which have to be enforced by all compliant
Security Services so that at least some level of secure interoperability can be
achieved CORBAsec speci
es KerberosV as such a mandatory mechanism
but also de
nes SESAME SSL SPKM
Interoperability between security policy domains can only be achieved if
the standard privileges are used Alternatively the speci
cation mentions
 but does not specify socalled bridges	 which could be used to translate the
security attributes between the domains This would again make the bridge a
trusted host which is risky for the security of the system Also it is sometimes
infeasible to map incompatible security attributes Again a feasible tradeo
is to mandate a minimum set of security attributes to enable interoperability
but allow exible extensions at the cost of compromising interoperability
A richer set of security attributes than the few SESAME based attributes
in the current version of CORBAsec would be useful Also the speci
cation
of attribute value formats for those standard attributes would be required to
make interoperability possible
  Security Mechanism Replaceability
One of the main design criteria was to keep CORBAsec as much as possi
ble independent from the underlying security technology and its interfaces
Therefore SECIOP does not carry out any cryptographic operations itself
nor does it directly call the underlying security mechanisms to do so Instead
CORBAsec contains an objectoriented abstraction layer which is inspired
by GSSAPI   ie based on credentials tokens and security contexts and
provides independence from both the underlying security and transport mech
anisms
This elegant concept of abstracting from the underlying security technology
and at the same time providing a common interface to the underlying secu
rity maximises both exibility and interoperability and works well for most
security mechanisms However some underlying mechanisms clash with the
GSSAPI based abstraction layer in particular socket interfaced based mech
anisms which provide their own TCPIP layer transport mechanism eg the

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common SSL protocol To solve this problem CORBAsec de
nes a separate
pluggable	 transport protocol for SSL the socalled SSLIOP protocol which
can be used instead of SECIOP when SSL is used as an underlying security
mechanism
 	 Security Service Replaceability
To achieve interoperability between ORBs and Security services from dierent
vendors socalled interceptor interfaces are proposed in the CORBAsec spec
i
cation through which the ORB automatically mediates all communications
The current version of the speci
cation uses two types of interceptors
message level interceptors	 which work on the raw communications buer
and request level interceptors	 which provide access to the CORBA request
According to the speci
cation message level interceptors are supposed to be
used for message protection the request level interceptor for access control
and audit The impact of the interceptor speci
cation on the security of
the overall system is considerable as the ORB needs to be guaranteed	 to
correctly mediate all requests through these interceptors
The original CORBA interceptor speci
cation was rather weak and so
most ORB vendors included additional proprietary interceptors into their
ORBs before they were explicitly speci
ed in the Portable Interceptors speci

cation and now their ORB architecture and all their products are based on
them Despite the need for common useable interceptors the OMG could not
agree on a common speci
cation for portable message level interceptors as this
would limit the exibility of the ORB implementation too much This makes it
almost impossible to integrate Security Services and ORBs from dierent ven
dors Another very common approach to implementing message protection are
pluggable protocols which allow replacing the standard transport level protcol
 TCP by a secure transport This allows the use of secure transport protocols
like SSL which does not 
t in CORBAsecs GSSAPI based abstraction of the
security mechanism and it is considered technically superior But it raises the
same interoperability issue there is no speci
cation for standard pluggable
protocols And it is very questionable whether there will ever be one because
it would also limit the exibility of the ORB implementation
This lack of interoperability violates the fundamental OMG goal to make
software from dierent vendors work together while the gained extreme level
of exibility is unneccessary Also the impact of the interceptor speci
cation
and implementation on the overall security eectiveness is signi
cant because
the security of the system would be compromised if messages can be prevented
from being mediated through the security service Therefore in addition to
the Security Services and the underlying mechanisms the ORB itself also
has to become part of the trusted computing base  TCB This makes the
whole concept of a security service	 questionable as the trustworthiness of
the whole system needs to be considered in order to be able to comment

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on security eectiveness However the fundamental clash of exibility and
assurance in CORBAsec is beyond the scope of this paper
 Conclusion
Many of the described problems are of a fundamental nature ie not COR
BAsec speci
c and cannot easily be solved in particular not on a speci
cation
level The security of the CORBA system depends on too many factors outside
the scope of any speci
cation to make it possible to write a Security Service
speci
cation that would cater for all possible CORBA systems The issues
related to exibility and interoperability as presented in this paper illustrate
only one examplary problem of CORBAsec
In practice many more problems will have to be dealt with to make COR
BAsec a sound basis for secure systems For example the clash between ex
ibility and assurance or the impact of the security service concept to system
security will be discussed by the authors in future publications
The current version of CORBAsec contains some good concepts to achieve
a sensible tradeo between exibility and interoperability Firstly the speci

cation of interfaces instead of implementations allows interoperability but at
the same time gives exibility to some extent Secondly the concept of de
n
ing a standardised minimal set of mandatory security attributes and attribute
formats achieves some level of interoperability while at the same time exi
bility is achieved by allowing implementers to extend the models by custom
attributes if they require more functionality at the cost of losing interoper
ability However as illustrated in this paper these concepts are not always
implemented properly in CORBAsec and it is hoped that future versions of
the speci
cation will do better
In general the CORBAsec speci
cation should create more awareness of
the fundamental problem described in this paper to allow implementers to
reach an informed decision whether exibility or interoperability are more im
portant to their application domain rather than claiming  as it is currently
implicitly done that the CORBAsec architecture can cater for all possible
application needs As a consequence application domain speci
c sets of at
tributes types and formats could be identi
ed by the respective OMG Domain
Task Forces so that ORBs can be customised for particular application do
mains eg telecommunications services without losing interoperability within
that application domain
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